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The Art Of Loving In The Classroom: A Defence Of Affective Pedagogy

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Most people see the problem of love primarily as that of being loved, rather than that of loving (Fromm, 1961, 1)

... if, by chance, there is a moment in the classroom in which the teacher and students feel linked in the common endeavour of learning, it is a wonderful thing. We should be moved by and grateful for such moments as if they were miracles (Itsuki, 2001, 27)

Teachers are the spirit that animates their students' lives (Metcalfe & Game, 2006, 163)

Abstract: This essay proposes a defence of a form of teaching eroded by what Sennet (2006) calls 'the culture of the new capitalism'. The term coined for the form under consideration here is 'affective pedagogy.'

Affective pedagogy is evident in teachers who:

- *value a discipline (or disciplines) and their associated practices;*
- *value imparting them to students;*
- *challenge students' learning achievements while respecting their developing intellects;*
- *assess students' academic progress transparently and constructively;*
- *encourage students to move beyond their knowledge comfort zones; and*
- *engage students in 'dramatic friendship'*

Introduction

The history of late-modern pedagogy may be read as a struggle between two broadly contending views. The first (and dominant) view is that education serves an instrumental purpose: it is a necessary investment in the development of human capital. To put it another way, it is a socialising means to an economic end. The second (and faltering) view is that education is about opening students' awareness to the many and complex underpinnings of human consciousness and civilisation in a rapidly globalising world. While this second view, too, may be seen as a means to an end, it is also viewed (and loved) by its proponents as an end in itself.

This contemporary struggle is, however, based on a distortion of the classical distinction between *episteme* and *techne* (broadly, theory and practice). Aristotle, for example, was convinced that good *techne* would always be grounded in sound *episteme*, resulting in *praxis* (Aristotle, 1980, Book VI): that is, the practitioners of good *techne* would possess an educated understanding (*episteme*) of the principles underlying their various practices. *Praxis* entails theory and practice continually and dynamically informing each other.

The British idealist philosopher Michael Oakeshott argued that a characteristically modern misunderstanding of Aristotle's distinction between *episteme* and *techne* was contributing to the decline of a range of profound human 'experiences' (Oakeshott, 1933, 1991). He proposed that the modern mind structured knowledge reductively into two increasingly discrete practices. Influenced by Aristotle, he called these practices 'technical knowledge' and 'practical knowledge.' The *conveying* of each of these forms of knowledge (the teaching activities they required) was inescapably shaped by the form of knowledge itself. For example:

Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; it can be learned in a correspondence course. Moreover, much of it can be learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically [...] Technical knowledge, in short, can be both taught and learned in the simplest meanings of these words (Oakeshott, 1991, 15).

The pedagogical strategies of technical knowledge are principally engaged in instilling reflex responses, routine tasking, memory drilling and rote learning. These are the characteristics of a pedagogical culture that is adept at instilling conformity and obedience.¹ Taken to its extreme, it can become suffocatingly chauvinist, leading to intolerance and even fanaticism. From Oakeshott's perspective, if it is not balanced by practical knowledge it is likely to lead to social and economic stagnation and even to the decline of civil society.

Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is acquired through relating closely to a teacher who has an intuitive expertise in the field of knowledge in question. It cannot be acquired from a training schedule, by the rote learning of a set of formulas or by rehearsing programatically-specified actions. As Oakeshott points out:

In the arts and natural science what normally happens is that the pupil, in being taught and in learning the technique from his master, discovers himself to have acquired also another sort of knowledge than merely technical knowledge, without it ever having been precisely imparted and often without being able to say precisely what it is. Thus a pianist acquires artistry as well as technique, a chess-player style and insight into the game as well as knowledge of the moves, and a scientist acquires (among other things) the sort of judgement which tells him his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which enables him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable directions to explore (Oakeshott, 1991, 15).

The imparting of practical knowledge necessarily entails complex emotional as well as intellectual interactions between the teacher and student. It can never be taught, for example, by identifying a few 'key words' and listing them as if they are part of some meaningful vocabulary. Assessing it is not a simple process either. Its

¹ This unbalanced stress on conveying technical knowledge at the expense of practical knowledge is the source of widespread criticism of the education system in contemporary Japan, for example (see Okano & Tsuchiya 1999; McVeigh 2002).

acquisition will very likely be misunderstood or overlooked, for example, by multiple choice testing.

What Oakeshott is gesturing towards is characterised in this paper as ‘affective pedagogy’.

Affective pedagogy

Affective pedagogy is as much about feelings and emotions as it is about learning outcomes. Indeed the feelings and emotions are inseparable from the learning outcomes. It is distinguished in the first instance by teacher-student interactions that echo Oakeshott’s depiction of ‘dramatic friendship’.

Dramatic friendship

Dramatic friendship means relating wholeheartedly to another person ‘who engages the imagination, who excites contemplation, who provokes interest, sympathy, delight and loyalty simply on account of the relationship entered into’ (Oakeshott, 1991, 537).

Oakeshott argues that dramatic friendship is overshadowed in modern societies by utilitarian friendship in which the relating is based on a calculation by both (or all) sides in the relating about what *use* they will be for each other: what benefit (apart from, or despite, the relating itself) may be gained from the relating, by the parties to it. This echoes Karl Marx’s theory of human estrangement (or alienation) under modern capitalism: ‘...each man measures his relationship to other men by the relationship in which he finds himself placed as a worker’ (Marx, 1977, 83).

In the first instance, Oakeshott’s understanding of dramatic friendship is of *Agape* (comradely or selfless love), embracing the capacity to love, altruistically and profoundly. This is a love that goes far beyond the obligations of *Philia* (filial love) and the demands of *Eros* (sexual love).² *Agape* alludes to love that is characterised by an acute intensity of mutual valuing. It is a love that is liberating and open, rounded and anticipatory, not closed into the here-and-now. It is more about loving rather than about being loved. It is the very antithesis of narcissism. It is love that is capable of achieving a state of ego-transcending intimacy. Neither *Philia* nor *Eros* is ruled out of this relating. However, if there are filial or erotic aspects to it, they are inconsequential. Many enduring, intimate friendships between members of the same and differing (or complementing) gendered identities, are of this order. At best, the late-modern world takes them for granted. At worst it misunderstands or devalues them. Nonetheless, they are invaluable, exquisitely human, and can only be experienced in all their complex totalities. To attempt a clumsy deconstruction of such friendships (for example, by focusing narrowly on their sexual elements or the engenderment of each of the parties in the relating) would be to reduce them to incomprehensibly discrete parts, because, as integrated wholes, they are far more than their constituent elements.

It is *Agape* that is at the heart of affective pedagogy.

² This is not to say that *Philia* and *Eros* are of no consequence, but *Agape*, in certain contexts, is superior to both. Mature marriage-like partnerships sometimes exhibit the finest features of *Agape*.

While almost always incorporating a utilitarian component, affective pedagogy's principal focus is on the thoughtful conveying of wisdom through relatings between the teacher and student—i.e., through 'dramatic friendship.'

In effect, healthy and productive teacher-student relationships are similar to relationships within functional (nurturing) families and between close friends. They should be regarded and valued in much the same way and regulated (only when absolutely necessary) in much the same way, but with immense sensitivity, and even then with reluctance.

Affective teacher-student relationships are never predictable. Of necessity they are simultaneously auspicious, dynamic and hazardous—like all dramatic friendships. For the teacher, it entails accepting emotional vulnerability as well as engaging in the conveying of knowledge. It also requires the highest ethical integrity. In short, it is risky—indeed, very risky. It is not for the faint-hearted or for those whose relatings are wilfully (or neurotically) constrained by chauvinistic or fundamentalist ideologies.

Student-teacher *relatings*

Teachers who practise affective pedagogy must be self-aware, self-confident and selfless in ways that enable them to engage in close (or intimate) and healthy relatings with their students.

The word 'relating(s)' is used here to protect critically-central teacher-student interactions from negative connotations attached to the word 'relationship(s)'. In recent times, loving or otherwise intimate relatings between students and teachers have sometimes been rather too hastily judged to be compromising, even transgressive. The result is that many teachers—especially male teachers—are hesitant about comforting an injured child or embracing a distraught student. While any *exploitative* intimacy (erotic or otherwise) is unacceptable, it is nonetheless the case that not all intimate or loving student-teacher relatings are anti-social or unethical. In appropriate circumstances, they are the very foundations of wise and humane teaching and learning outcomes.

It is well known that learning outcomes are influenced profoundly by personal interactions between teachers and students. As Oakeshott's view of dramatic friendship suggests, these relatings are central to conveying the intellectual and emotional resources with which late-modern students need to be familiar in order to deal with a rapidly-globalising world. Yet many contemporary schools, vocational colleges and universities are adopting teaching processes that are hostile to affective pedagogy. A plethora of laptops will not deliver a good education if the intention is to use them to replace close relatings—dramatic friendships—between teachers and students. The fad for replacing real teachers with technology can only result in an increasingly dehumanised pedagogy and the vandalising of the very art of teaching as a form of loving.

Intellect and emotion

This vandalising is aggravated by the severing of intellectual conduct from its emotional roots. It is one of modernity's many conceits (part of its spiritual hubris) that reason is required to be a cold-blooded affair, necessitating a kind of emotional and intellectual self-sterilisation.

In *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the Emotions* (2001), Martha Nussbaum refutes this narrowly-conceived approach to knowledge: she proposes that ‘... emotions always involve thought of an object continued with thought of the object’s salience or importance; in that sense they always involve appraisal and evaluation’ (Nussbaum, 2001, 23). According to her argument, bringing the emotions back in not only recognises their contributions to the weighing of life’s choices, but also to life’s flourishing.

An affective pedagogy can be conceptualised around the intelligent integrating of intellect and emotion, as championed by Nussbaum, by identifying the unique relatings at its core. As she reminds us: ‘... emotions look at the world from the subject’s own viewpoint, mapping events onto the subject’s own sense of personal importance or value’ (Nussbaum, 2001, 33).

It is important to remind ourselves that affective pedagogy is not simply about producing compliant workers and obedient consumers. It is mostly about contributing to the nurturing of citizenship in democratic cultures. Democratic citizenship takes root where individuals and groups are able to participate, intelligently and responsibly, in making the decisions that affect their lives. It requires informed people with well-developed capacities to cooperate sympathetically, tolerantly and with understanding across a wide range of cultural, religious, language and gender barriers.

Good teaching and learning methodologies contribute profoundly to the making of citizenship in this sense. To achieve this, they need to embrace the human experience in all its complexities and possibilities at intellectual *and* emotional levels. This entails the cultivation of purposeful, mature relatings between teachers and students.

If these relatings are constrained, formal and programatically predictable - if they are confined to risk-free regimes of performance that lack all forms of human spontaneity - the learning outcomes will be emotionally constipated, intellectually truncated and culturally backward. They cannot facilitate the making of democratic citizenship, ‘the present and future capacity for influencing policies through participation, discussion and voting’ (Thompson, 1970, 2; see also Pateman, 1975).

In *Cultivating Humanity* (1997), Nussbaum offers an impressive defence of the modern academy as a place that needs to be characterised by richly pluralistic relatings in which

... women, and members of religious and ethnic minorities, and lesbians and gay people, and people living in non-Western cultures can be seen and also heard, with respect and love, both as knowers and objects of study, an academy in which to be ‘fellowess’ need not mean being called ‘courtesan’, an academy in which the world will be seen to have many types of citizens and in which we can all learn to function as citizens of that entire world (Nussbaum, 1997, 7).

Her defence of pluralism in the academy is underpinned by Oakeshott’s concept of ‘dramatic friendship’. It is also linked intimately to Charles Taylor’s account of the ‘ethics of authenticity’ and the ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor, 1991, 1994, 2007).

All three philosophers want the authenticities of human agency to flourish in the context of a richly communitarian culture. Hence the school or university has to be a place in which individuals and the communities and identities they reflect, articulate and help to reproduce are understood and valued for what they are, not for whatever narrowly utilitarian purposes they may perform for self-serving authorities or crusading advocates of some universally-standardised norm.

Utilitarian pedagogy

The apparently preferred contemporary teaching practices in late-modern education systems can be identified as utilitarian pedagogy. They are often conducted in self-regarding psycho-social zones that isolate individuals from each other and severely constrain the scope of the curriculum. These zones exclude the cultivation of a sympathetic understanding of the cultural Other while promoting an ego-defensiveness and anti-social narcissism—a new fear of freedom, perhaps—that posits a highly-subjectified self struggling to survive in an increasingly complex world (More & Salecl, 2004). The self becomes the centre of the struggle for survival. Relating and community (altruism) are out; self-constructing (egotism) is in. Furedi refers to this as the ‘politics of fear’, by which ‘politicians self-consciously manipulate people’s anxieties in order to realise their objectives’ (Furedi, 2005, 123). He sees the neo-liberal revival of egoism (or sheer selfishness) in ethics as being driven or amplified by the politics of fear.

This contemporary subjectivism absorbs increasing numbers of superficially-affluent people (an emerging neo-nouveau riche class) who invest routinely in (consume) material symbols that they conflate into their self-constructing. Hamilton & Dennis (2005) describe this development as ‘affluenza.’ It’s the material symbols that now make the man and woman. These symbols encompass large houses, powerful cars, boats, élite schools for their children’s education, luxury resort vacations, golf clubs, personal fitness regimes, dieting and lifestyle activities (for example, regular visits to gyms, ‘fat farms’ or ‘detox clinics’), recreational drug use (including alcohol), reliance on advice from clairvoyants, spiritualists, and astrologists, adherence to fundamentalist religious organisations, and access to soft-porn private entertainment systems (videos, Internet sites, magazines).

Hamilton (2006) points to the pathology of ‘luxury fever’ gripping the contemporary ‘middle class’:

...which has driven many thousands of individuals to borrow more money than they can comfortably afford to repay in order to satisfy their escalating acquisitiveness. In other words many people have set their sights on levels of comfort and luxury they cannot afford and have taken on too much debt in order to get there (Hamilton, 2006, 28).

The investments (or borrowings) involved in transacting these symbols of material achievement make people financially vulnerable to interest rate hikes, job insecurity pressures and related life crises.

This late-modern focus on obsessive self-constructing is producing a new form of petty-bourgeois politics in which private (or possessive) property rights are awarded heightened salience. But they are rights that are heavily mortgaged and hence compromised. The vulnerabilities arising from this mortgaged insecurity are frequently transposed to other psycho-political domains. They are linked, for example, to rising levels of depression, paranoia and xenophobia; to strident enthusiasms for law and order campaigns; to calls for a return to capital punishment; to antipathy to immigrants and asylum seekers; to intolerance of people from different cultural backgrounds; racism; homophobia; and opposition to welfare programs. This is the so-called ‘neo-con’ agenda.

The populism driving this agenda morally anaesthetises people to the plight of the Other, not only harming those relegated to this category, but also precipitating resentment, inferiority complexes, and self-harm in those whom it holds in its thrall. As Charles Taylor notes:

To shut out demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to suppress the conditions of significance, and hence to court trivialization... [T]his is self-immuring and self-stultifying... Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial... Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands (1991, 40; see also Taylor, 2007, Chapter 13)

The contemporary preoccupation with narcissistic versions of an *inauthentic* self is rooted in a wide range of late-modern cultural structures that give priority to ‘self’ over community, and to a constrained understanding of the importance of individualism over communitarianism.

Neo-liberal economics and utilitarian pedagogy

The move away from affective pedagogy to utilitarian pedagogy is inextricably intertwined with the prevailing culture of narcissism and psycho-economic vulnerability. It results in liberal curriculum being elbowed aside to make way for ‘relevant’ curriculum that conforms to micro-economic policies assumed to increase productivity and delivers a workforce that can be disciplined efficiently.

The central rationale for ‘relevant’ curriculum is allegedly employment. Teachers are increasingly being required to train students for the restricted range of jobs predicted to follow neo-liberal economic reforms, for example in industrial relations and in the devising of enterprise bargaining agreements (Katz, 2005; Pace & Connolly, 2000). Teachers are exhorted and cajoled by politicians and business leaders to prepare students to be ‘work ready’, or ‘job relevant’. They are required to produce students who are not ‘work shy’ or ‘job snobs’, and who will do what they’re told, no matter how casualised or part-time the work, and no matter how little it meets their (legitimate) hopes and dreams.

The utilitarian pedagogy that is in tune with the prevailing neo-liberal ideology is reinforced by official attempts to identify and reward those teachers who conform to its dictates through public awards for ‘teaching excellence’. For example, the Howard government established the Carrick Institute for Learning and Teaching in Higher Education, which assumed responsibility for government-sponsored national teaching awards. These awards, however well-intentioned, are also a form of patronage that fits into the neo-liberal education reform agenda. It is time to subject them to a much closer scrutiny because they can result in intrusive, manipulative or crassly- managerialised outcomes. If, as seems likely, they can be shown to be biased toward utilitarian pedagogy, they will end up trivialising good teachers and marginalising affective pedagogy. It may even be the case that the awards are a means for controlling teachers.

A similar move to manage and control teachers is evident in the misuse of student evaluations of learning and teaching (SELT). Research has shown for some time now that the philosophical and pedagogical outcomes of SELT are questionable. Indeed evidence suggests that high SELT scores do not automatically equate with good learning outcomes (see, for example, Felton et al., 2006). Despite this kind of evidence, educational managers are using the scores for purposes other than improving pedagogy As McDonald & Mills (2007) point out:

... the original purposes of SET – as an optional tool used by individual academics to help evaluate and then enhance their teaching – have been displaced by its use as a mandatory, managerial procedure for summary purposes such as performance management, accountability and promotion

McDonald & Mills (2007, 15).

This is not to deny that good teachers deserve – and, indeed, need – greater recognition and reward. And all teachers need always to be improving their curricula and the ways they deliver them. But, if the current teaching awards and SELT measures are misused, or if they are simply driven by bureaucratic procedures and reductive selection criteria, the consequent measures and awards are likely to achieve little more than highlighting a depressing ignorance among those who claim to be able to identify ‘good pedagogy’ and good teaching practices.

The constraints of utilitarian pedagogy *Performance versus understanding*

Utilitarian pedagogy focuses on outcomes of *performance* rather than on outcomes of *understanding*. The two outcomes are not always in conflict, but if they get out of balance, the former is likely to constrain (or even erase) the effectiveness of the latter. Giving priority to outcomes of performance means that students’ learning outcomes are limited mainly to skills acquisition, conditioning and mental programming. This is Oakeshott’s ‘technical knowledge’. Its pedagogical strategies are engaged primarily in instilling reflex responses, routine tasking, memory drilling and rote learning. If it is permitted to monopolise curriculum it will lead to a culture of ideological conformity and a retreat from imagining alternatives to the crises now facing humankind on a global level. Performance outcomes are vital in education, but they need to be grounded in understandings of both the principles governing those outcomes and the possibilities for anticipating modes of adaptation and change when the prevailing performance strategies cease to be effective – as, for example, the deniers of climate change are beginning to discover.

False economies

Utilitarian pedagogy is mistakenly thought to require less relating between teachers and students. This makes it especially attractive in the minds of neo-liberal policy-makers intent on achieving more budget cuts or controlling teachers (Saunders, 2006). The irony is that its success rates, however measured, improve radically the more ‘dramatic’ the teacher-student interactions, provided they are positive (see, for example, Cahyadi, 2004).³ It should come as no surprise that utilitarian pedagogy resonates with the neo-liberal agenda because it meshes with the latter’s realist assumptions and positivist pragmatism. It appears to be cheaper to deliver, although appearances can be misleading (Brennan et al., 2000). It is thought capable of getting production lines running, jobs created and economies growing. In all likelihood, it achieves none of these purblind purposes (Postman, 1993).

³ The importance of close teacher-student interactions in utilitarian pedagogy is evident, for example, in many of the relationships that exist between coaches and athletes (see, for example, Magean & Vallerand 2003).

Utilitarian pedagogy and multimedia learning technologies

The privileging of utilitarian pedagogy over affective pedagogy is strikingly evident in the cargo-cult growing around multimedia technologies in education.

Education managers are increasingly calling for teaching to be delivered on line or via a range of multimedia strategies that minimise the relations between teachers and students (for example, Abate, 2000; Bigum & Kenway, 2000). The advocates of this cult proclaim the advantages of the Internet and associated multimedia technologies in most educational contexts, especially in technical and further education and in universities (University of Illinois, 1999).

There can be little doubt that the Internet *is* a powerful educational resource. And it is not untrue that multimedia technologies can enhance teaching strategies. But we commit pedagogical vandalism if we use these things to supplant dedicated teachers capable of offering the dramatic friendship that is always present wherever educating is being done well. These people embrace, as their characteristic talent, the gift of nurturing students' nascent intellectual, emotional, and spiritual identities. Like good parents, they are significant sources of recognition and affirmation, authorising in each student's mind her unfathomable depth, his ineffable worth.

Now these teachers are being told to get real and to get on line. Multimedia tools like PowerPoint are taking precedence over teaching as relating. They are fast becoming the opiate of the pedagogue. For example, we increasingly see dot points flashed on screens and recited, often with deadpan delivery, as students scramble to copy them down. The reliability of this form of delivery is rarely questioned and when it is, the answers are not always what its shrill proponents want to hear. Kalyuga, et al. (2004), for example, using cognitive load theory and empirical data they generated themselves, have shown that simultaneous visual and aural presentations have a significantly negative effect on learning outcomes. This has very important implications for instructional methodologies such as PowerPoint.

Many teachers are being forced to retreat into on-line delivery of substantial elements of the curriculum (Paulson, 2002). The truly dramatic arts of lecturing, discussing, exploring, interacting and conversing, responding to students' enquiries and comments, and dialoguing in class are being marginalised as technology takes over. Moreover, if nurturing and mentoring are needed in schools today, they are handled therapeutically, by professional counsellors, not by teachers.

Taken to its extreme, utilitarian pedagogy could result in teachers eventually being confined to a virtual space, potentially even continents away from their students (Palfreeman, 1998). Cooped up in remote teaching call-centres and virtually remote from their students, they will be limited to what can be conveyed electronically rather than personally or dramatically (Ryan et al., 2000). Teaching will no longer be a special and valued form of relating; rather it will become a taken-for-granted form of impersonal techno-communicating. Only the rich will be able to afford the personalised (real, *in situ*) tutors who will be needed to back up the virtual educators.

This toxic mix of extreme utilitarian education and socio-economic privileging flies in the face of two basic errors at its very core. The first is mistaking information for knowledge. The second is confusing downloading with educating. If educating can be achieved on the Internet, so can parenting. We should know this already from the highly questionable history of distance-learning practices. It is well known that spatial and virtual distances rapidly become psychological and emotional distances, inhibiting successful learning, or even blocking it altogether.

If we simply set out to train students, by prioritising utilitarian pedagogy at the expense of affective pedagogy, the result will be unthinking automata, alienated and hyper-individualised psyches whose emotional foci will be virtual relationships managed via computer screens and remote e-sites. In short, our graduates will be latter-day versions of *Brave New World's* epsilons.

The friendship deficit in the classroom

Too many contemporary classrooms are starting to exhibit what may be referred to as a friendship deficit (see Deegan 1996). Awkward emotional distances, inhibited and repressed feelings, and defensive and cynical attitudes characterise too many contemporary teacher-student relations (Fritschner, 2000; Furnham & McManus, 2004). These serious problems are of course aggravated by oversized classes (Weaver, 2005). Students are looked upon as fodder for per capita funding grants, or necessary evils that get in the way of research time, presenting at academic conferences, time off for ‘professional development,’ attending meetings, or engaging in consultancies. Too often students come a distant last in a great deal of university policy-making, where ‘research’ is fetishised at the expense of educating by blinkered administrators who fail to see the creative and dynamic relationship between both of these activities. The friendship deficit in the classroom can be overcome by restoring affective pedagogy to the centre of teaching methodologies.

Affective pedagogy can also make a vital and healing contribution to a world that is in danger of tearing itself apart through sociopathic labelling processes and a contrived ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1996; Ali, 2002). These nightmare probabilities are closely related. They emerge out of ignorance about the authenticity of people from cultural, religious, linguistic, gendered and ethnic identities different from those of powerful cultural and moral gatekeepers. They are reinforced by an absence of dramatic friendship. They are exacerbated when authorities assert arbitrarily that their particular cultural milieu constitutes some universal norm against which other traditions are to be judged—and usually found wanting. This tendency is as old as humanity, but the latter-day politics it is provoking is particularly threatening. An appropriate response to this is to revive a pedagogy that can acknowledge fruitfully that, in today’s world, as Benhabib (1999, 51) points out:

We have become moral contemporaries, caught in a net of interdependence, and our contemporaneous actions will also have tremendous uncontemporaneous consequences. The global situation creates a new community, a ‘community of interdependence.

The possibility that an exclusively utilitarian pedagogy can address the ‘community of interdependence’ in any sensible way is remote. Affective pedagogy addresses it directly and positively.

Conclusion

Confronted (and affronted) by an absence of affective pedagogy, young people throughout our late-modern education systems face a future that threatens to see them in the ranks of a twenty-first century ‘global peasantry,’ slavishly producing clean, cheap food for the distant obese rich. Our daughters will vie for jobs as meter maids or bar bimbos, with trade diplomas in ‘hospitality,’ selling their labour and their

bodies in yet another synthetic resort or casino. Our sons will be obsequious tour guides or button-pressing IT monkeys with dead-end ‘skills’, keeping the lazy élites tuned in and turned on. A rootless clique in our midst—cloned MBAs from on-line providers in other parts of the world—will crack the whips through tricky ‘enterprise bargaining’ to force the rest of us into turning profits for absentee bosses and faceless boards of directors.

A defence of affective pedagogy can help challenge this grim scenario. Its rich cultivation of human relatings and recognitions counters narcissism and alienation, and nurtures what Erich Fromm (1961) referred to as ‘the art of loving’, an art that is presently in seeming abeyance amid the wrung-out sadness and emotional exhaustion that marks so much of the late-modern era.

Affective pedagogues, like good parents, cannot be over-estimated and they must never be under-estimated. The practising of their vocation graces them with the capacity to recognise valuable things within their students, things students can trust, things that will help them grow personally, culturally and socially.

Out of this comes civilisation, nothing less.

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